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Abstract: Recent developments have transformed the role and characteristics
of middle-income countries (MICs). Many stakeholders now question the
appropriate role of MICs in the system of development assistance for health
(DAH), and key funders have already recast their approach to these countries. The
pressing question is whether MICs should be recipients, funders, both or neither.
The answer has deep implications for individual countries and their citizens, and
for the DAH system as a whole. We clarify the fundamental issues involved and
emphasise a special feature of many MICs: mid-level gross national income per
capita (GNIpc) combined with substantial health needs and large inequalities.
We discuss the trade-off between concerns for capacity and need, and illustrate
a capacity-based approach to setting the level of a GNIpc eligibility threshold.
We also discuss how needs-based exceptions and incentive-preserving instruments
can complement such a threshold. Against this background, we outline options for
the future roles of MICs in various circumstances. We conclude that major players
in the DAH system have reason to reconsider the criteria for allocating
DAH among countries and the norms for which countries should contribute
and how much.
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Introduction
Recent changes
Recent developments have transformed the role and characteristics of middle-
income countries (MICs), as defined by theWorld Bank. TheMICs have increased
in number, and the economies of many of current MICs have been rapidly
growing, yet often coupled with rising or persistent within-country inequalities.
The MIC category now comprises 105 countries (fiscal year 2015), 70% of the
world’s population, over 30% of the global GDP, over 75% of the world’s poor,
and almost 70% of the disease burden in the world (Sumner, 2012) [based on data
from the World Bank and the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation
(IHME)].
These transitions have reinforced a special feature of MICs collectively and of
many MICs individually: mid-level gross national income per capita (GNIpc)
combined with substantial poverty and unmet health needs and large inequalities
in income and health. For example, in several of these countries, the under-five
mortality rate (U5MR) in the lowest wealth quintile is more than double the
rate in the highest wealth quintile [World Health Organisation (WHO), 2015].
Moreover, many MICs are now both recipients and increasingly significant
funders of aid [Global Health Strategies initiatives (GHSi), 2012; IHME, 2016].
Challenge and key questions
In response to these changes, many have questioned the role ofMICs in the system
of development assistance for health (DAH). The pressing question is this: should
MICs be DAH recipients, funders, both, or neither? As nearly all countries are
DAH funders to some extent, for example through their contributions to the UN
system, the real question is about which countries should be significant recipients
and funders. This is currently a topic of intense debate, and the positions differ
widely, as expressed in both word and action. On the one side are those who
support that aid should be concentrated in low-income countries (LICs), and in
line with this view, Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance (Gavi) and the International
Development Association (IDA) use eligibility thresholds that exclude most and
nearly allMICs, respectively. On the other side are those who support that most or
all MICs should be fully eligible for development assistance or at least provide
forceful arguments to that end (Glennie, 2011; Verbeke and Renard, 2011;
Kanbur and Sumner, 2012; Glassman et al., 2013). Corresponding to this, funders
such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund),
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP) consider all MICs eligible for assistance (reference
to paper by Ottersen, Kamath, Moon, Martinsen and Røttingen in this series).
Despite this profound divergence in approaches to MICs, there have been
relatively few comprehensive analyses of the various roles they may play in
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development assistance (Glennie, 2011; Verbeke and Renard, 2011; Kanbur and
Sumner, 2012; Alonso et al., 2014; Kanbur, 2016), and hardly any such inquiries
with regard to DAH (Glassman et al., 2013).
Underlying the specific question about MICs is also a fundamental question for
the DAH system: what should be the criteria for identifying recipient and funding
countries? Linked to both questions is the issue of country classification and
income classification in particular.
Objective
We wanted to address the specific question about what roles MICs can play in
DAH and the more general question about criteria for identifying recipient and
funding countries. Below, we initially focus on direct financial transfers and the
criteria for identifying countries that should reasonably be net recipients and net
funders, respectively. We first seek to clarify the fundamental issues involved and
highlight a special feature of many MICs. We then examine allocation criteria
and the identification of recipients, before addressing contribution norms and
the identification of funders. In the final section, we conclude and offer some
recommendations for decision makers.
Importance
Examining what roles the MICs can play is important because MIC is a category
widely used today and because many believe that the role different countries should
have in the DAH system can be usefully tied to their income class (reference to paper
by Ottersen, Kamath, Moon, Martinsen and Røttingen in this series). According to
the World Bank classification for the fiscal year 2015, countries with GNIpc⩽
$1045 in 2013 are classified as LICs; countries with GNIpc $1046–4125 and
$4126–12,745 as lower- and upper middle-income countries (LMICs and UMICs),
respectively; and countries with GNIpc ⩾$12,746 as high-income countries (HICs)
(World Bank, 2015). While this classification and the MIC category is commonly
used, it is also widely agreed that MICs are very heterogeneous, and several
categorisations of MICs have been offered. For example, one recent proposal
categorises MICs in genuine MICs, premature MICs, post-Soviet ‘bounce-back’
MICs, andMICs with small populations (Sumner, 2016). Irrespective of their view
on GNIpc per se, most people also seem to agree that the GNIpc classification
thresholds are at least somewhat arbitrary and that the question about how these
thresholds should be adjusted over time can be difficult. Nonetheless, examining
the role of MICs can be highly instructive because a simple income classification
may be a useful starting point for decisions on eligibility and allocation of
DAH even if such a classification is imperfect and insufficient alone.
Answers to the specific question about MICs and the general question about
criteria can have profound implications for individual countries and the DAH
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system as a whole. The importance of satisfactory answers is further underscored
by the general economic downturn and the stagnation of DAH after a decade of
unprecedented growth (IHME, 2016), the epidemiological transition and rise of
non-communicable diseases, the increasing complexity of the DAH landscape, the
ongoing work on the UN Sustainable Development Goals, and the upsurge of
initiatives for new financing mechanisms for global health which require norms for
which countries should contribute and how much (contribution norms) and criteria
for which countries should receive funding and howmuch (allocation criteria) [Ooms
et al., 2006; Consultative Expert Working Group (CEWG), 2012; Gostin, 2014]
(reference to paper by Ottersen, Kamath, Moon, Martinsen and Røttingen in this
series). The challenge posed by MICs also motivated the recent Equitable Access
Initiative – a multi-partner initiative set to develop a new framework to classify
countries and to guide global health investments (Equitable Access Initiative, 2015).
Finally, contribution norms and allocation criteria can be as pivotal to the financing
and provision of global public goods as to traditional DAH.
The special feature of MICs
The crux of the issue is a special feature of most MICs: mid-level GNIpc and
substantial health needs and large inequalities. These characteristics will for most
people pull in opposite directions. Mid-level GNIpc may suggest that MICs have
the internal capacity to respond to domestic health needs, or at least greater
capacity than LICs. Accordingly, one may hold that MICs have no claim on DAH
and should be ineligible, or at least that DAH to MICs are less important than
to LICs. Mid-level GNIpc may also suggest that many MICs can and should
contribute significantly to DAH. On the other hand, substantial unmet health
needs suggests that DAH toMICs is warranted, as meeting such needs is generally
considered a central purpose of DAH. In fact, the absolute amount of unmet need
and the number of individuals in need will often be greater in MICs than in
LICs. Accordingly, one may hold that MICs have a claim on DAH and should be
eligible, and perhaps even that DAH toMICs is equally or more important than to
LICs. Balancing the concerns associated with GNIpc and unmet health needs is
thus the crux of the issue, and this balancing act is a useful starting point for
analysing the roles MICs can play and the criteria for identifying recipient and
funding countries.
Table 1 highlights the points just made. It exhibits central characteristics of
LICs, LMICs, UMICs, and HICs, as well as of some countries in each class.
Beyond GNIpc, the characteristics include indicators related to need, inequality,
health expenditure and DAH received. The ‘cross’ category emphasises four
central relationships. GNI/U5M is the ratio of GNI to under-five mortality
(U5M) while GNI/DALY is the ratio of GNI to the number of disability-adjusted
life years (DALYs). Both ratios can be seen as a measure of a country’s economic
capacity to address needs per unit of unmet health needs. Correspondingly,
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Table 1. Key characteristics of low-income countries (LICs), middle-income countries (MICs) and high-income countries (HICs)










































LICs 34 849 664 74 76 555 na na na 10 2.0 6498 8.0 0.2 0.6 2.9 15
Ethiopia 94 470 72 64 534 3.2 34 1.6 9 2.1 816 9.6 0.2 0.7 3.8 18
Tanzania 49 630 73 52 586 3.2 38 1.2 16 2.9 697 15.0 0.3 0.9 6.5 26
LMICs 50 2561 2067 51 59 417 na na na 33 1.7 5113 2.1 1.5 4.1 1.4 5
India 1252 1570 61 53 416 3.7 34 3.0 20 1.3 933 0.8 1.4 3.1 0.6 2
Vietnam 90 1730 12 24 242 2.9 36 na 44 2.8 295 2.8 4.6 5.1 8.2 14
Ghana 26 1760 52 78 485 2.0 43 1.7 47 3.0 224 9.0 0.7 2.6 3.5 19
Nigeria 174 2710 82 117 795 2.2 43 2.5 29 1.2 757 4.6 0.6 1.8 0.9 6
Indonesia 250 3580 43 29 303 3.4 36 2.5 43 1.2 223 0.9 6.4 8.3 1.5 3
UMICs 55 2409 7594 14 20 266 na na na 248 3.7 2836 1.2 24.1 22.5 3.7 4
Thailand 67 5370 4 13 280 2.8 39 na 164 3.1 86 1.2 39.1 15.4 8.6 5
China 1357 6560 19 13 244 1.7 42 na 180 3.1 207 0.2 42.7 17.0 0.9 1
South Africa 53 7190 26 44 653 1.1 65 na 309 4.1 666 13.2 7.8 9.1 12.8 20
Colombia 48 7560 12 17 255 1.1 54 2.2 402 5.7 114 2.4 23.4 21.4 6.9 10
Brazil 200 11,690 7 14 277 1.0 53 na 490 4.2 175 0.9 56.4 34.3 3.8 3
HICs 76 1175 42,881 na 7 267 na na na 3170 7.5 0 0 527.0 125.3 0 0
UK 64 42,040 na 5 271 2.9 33 na 3025 7.4 0 0 715.4 141.9 0 0
Norway 5 104,130 na 3 248 3.6 26 na 7947 8.0 0 0 3148.5 350.1 0 0
UK = United Kingdom. na = Not available. Number: number of countries in income class. World Bank classification for fiscal year 2015, based GNIpc for 2013. Population: number of
people in millions. World Bank data for 2013. GNIpc: gross national income per capita, Atlas method, in US$. World Bank data for 2013. Averages provided directly by the World Bank.
% in poverty at $2/day: poverty headcount ratio at $2/day (purchasing power parity) in per cent. World Bank data for most recently available year, but no later than 2010 except for
Ghana (2006). Averages provided directly by the World Bank. U5MR: under-five mortality rate per 1000 live births. World Bank data for 2013. Averages provided directly by the World
Bank. DALY rate: disability-adjusted life years per 1000 people. Based on IHME data on DALY rate for 2010. Population-weighted averages. Income share of lowest 10%: income share
held by the 10% of the population with the lowest income, in per cent. World Bank data for most recently available year, but no later than 2010 except for India (2009) and Ghana (2006).
Gini index: World Bank data for most recently available year, but no later than 2010 except for India (2009) and Ghana (2006). U5MR ratio across quintiles: under-five mortality rate per
1000 live birth in the lowest wealth quintile relative to the rate in the highest quintile. Data fromWorld Health Statistics 2014 for most recently available year, but no later than 2005–2006
(India). GHEpc: Government health expenditure per capita, in US$. Based on World Bank data for 2012. Averages provided directly by the World Bank. GHE/GNI: Government health
expenditure relative to gross national income, in per cent. Based onWorld Bank data for 2012. Population-weighted averages. DAH: development assistance for health received, in million
US$. IHME data for 2011. Figures include only DAH that could be tracked to a particular recipient country. DAHpc: development assistance for health received per capita, in US$. IHME
data for 2011. Figures include only DAH that could be tracked to a particular recipient country. Population-weighted averages based on World Bank data on population for 2011. GNI/
U5M: gross national income relative to under-five mortality, in thousands. Based onWorld Bank data on GNI, population, and U5MR for 2013 and crude birth rate for 2012. Population-
weighted averages. GNI/DALY: gross national income relative to disability-adjusted life years, in thousands. Based on World Bank data on GNI for 2010 and IHME data on DALYs for
2010. Population-weighted averages. DAH/U5M: development assistance for health received relative to under-fivemortality. Based on IHME data on DAH for 2011 andWorld Bank data
on population, crude birth rate, and U5MR for 2011. Population-weighted averages. DAH/DALY: development assistance for health received relative to disability-adjusted life years.
Based on IHME data on DAH for 2011 and DALYs for 2010. Population-weighted averages.
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DAH/U5M and DAH/DALY can be seen as measures of DAH per unit of unmet
health needs.
Table 1 indicates how GNIpc and unmet health needs tend to be inversely
correlated, but also that this trend has important exceptions, given that several
countries have greater needs than countries with lower GNIpc. Apart from inter-
country relations, Table 1 also demonstrates the substantial unmet needs in
LMICs and even UMICs. South Africa, for example, has a GNIpc that places it
well within the UMIC class, while U5MR is very high and higher than in several
LMICs and even in some LICs (not shown). Moreover, the severe situation of
certain populations stands out even clearer if one also considers the ratio of
U5MR in the lowest and highest wealth quintile. In India, for example, that ratio
is as high as three. When it comes to the cross categories, there is also clear trends
across GNIpc and countries categories, as well as important exceptions. For
example, while Brazil has a national income of 56 million/child death, Ethiopia
has only 0.2 million. Ethiopia has thus arguably a much lower capacity to address
these deaths and may be in greater need of development assistance. With regard to
DAH, one clear example of cross-country variation is how Vietnam receives
almost 14 times more DAH per child death than India, despite the two countries
having similar GNIpc.
Allocation criteria and identification of recipients
When considering the role of MICs in the DAH system, it is natural to start
examining the relevance of GNIpc.
National income and capacity
Today, GNIpc is a prominent criterion for identifying recipients and for deter-
mining the amount of DAH to be received (reference to paper by Ottersen,
Kamath, Moon, Martinsen and Røttingen in this series). The central role of
GNIpc criteria can be explained by the quantitative and objective nature of
GNIpc, the availability of data, and its relationship to overarching objectives and
criteria for development assistance. For development assistance in general, GNIpc
can be an indicator of development need, effectiveness and capacity. For DAH, the
link to capacity is likely to be most relevant. While national incomemay be seen as
integral to general development need, DAH is primarily concerned with unmet
health needs. As is well known, GNIpc is correlated with many health outcomes,
including life expectancy, but the correlation between GNIpc and health needs is
far from perfect, as is indicated in Table 1 and Figure 3. Similarly, DAH is
primarily concerned with effectiveness in terms of improvements in health
outcomes, and a consistent link between GNIpc and such improvements has yet to
be established. Development assistance may be more effective in MICs than
in LICs, but the relationship between level of GNIpc and effectiveness of
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development assistance is clearly not a straightforward one (Glennie, 2011;
Verbeke and Renard, 2011; Kanbur and Sumner, 2012; Glassman et al., 2013;
Alonso et al., 2014; Glennie and Sumner, 2014).
Higher GNIpc generally indicates greater domestic capacity, where domestic
capacity is understood as the country’s ability to address needs without external
support. This understanding is in line with many other definitions of capacity, and
capacity so understood relates to ability to pay, fiscal space and absence of
financial constraints (Reddy andHeuty, 2004; Knack et al., 2012; Glassman et al.,
2013; Resch et al., 2015). Capacity as the ability to meet needs without external
support is different from absorptive capacity, which is the country’s ability to
effectively make use of such support.
GNIpc is a broader capacity indicator than both general government expendi-
ture per capita (GGEpc) and government health expenditure per capita (GHEpc).
This is underscored by the fact that governments have numerous levers at their
disposal to raise the levels of GGEpc and GHEpc even for a given level of GNIpc
(reference to paper by Elovainio and Evans; paper by Meheus and McIntyre; and
paper by McCoy, Chigudu and Tillmann in this series).
The idea that higher GNIpc indicates greater capacity can be combined
with the generally acknowledged principle that countries with greater capacity
have less claim on external support. This principle is sometimes motivated by
ideals for allocating aid on the basis of responsibility, desert or equality of
opportunity among countries (Llavador and Roemer, 2001; Cogneau and
Naudet, 2007). However, if individuals are our ultimate unit of concern, it is
equality of opportunity among individuals that really matters. Nevertheless,
holding countries responsible for reasons related to incentives can be
compatible with this. The very activity of holding states responsible – including
allocating less DAH to countries with higher GNIpc – may reduce perverse
incentives and moral hazard, and induce higher domestic health spending,
with positive consequences for individuals overall. Conversely, if states qualify
for DAH irrespectively of GNIpc and their capacity to address domestic health
needs, they may not be motivated to invest sufficiently in health and health
services. This mechanism is discussed extensively in several bodies of literature,
including those on aid conditionality and aid dependency (Svensson, 2000;
Gibson et al., 2005).
Identifying capacity thresholds
Given the preceding discussion, it is relevant to explore how a general GNIpc
threshold may be specified from a capacity perspective. This can be done by
considering the minimumGNIpc necessary to ensure priority services for different
levels of effort. Such an attempt is bound to be crude, but a general threshold –
based on concerns for capacity or otherwise – can be useful in practice even if
imperfect and insensitive to many country particularities. The approach outlined
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can also provide a framework for reasoning and starting point for further
discussion and for adjustments of thresholds.
From a capacity perspective, the search for a threshold may start by asking what
minimum level of GNIpc that is required for a country to ensure priority services
for everyone if it exerts very high effort. This level can be sought by way of two
steps. First, one estimates the minimum level of GHEpc typically required to
ensure priority services for everyone. The 2001 Commission on Macroeconomics
and Health (CMH) and the 2009 Task Force for Innovative International
Financing for Health Systems (HLTF) have provided such estimates for total
health expenditure per capita (THEpc) (CMH, 2001; HLTF, 2009). A recently
updated estimate based on the HLTF methodology suggests that GHEpc of $861
(in both 2012 and 2015 terms) is the minimum expenditure required in 2015 to
ensure priority services for everyone the context of LICs (reference to paper by
McIntyre, Meheus and Røttingen in this series).2 The rationale for seeing $86 as
a target for GHEpc rather than THEpc is that in order to ensure universal health
coverage (UHC) of priority services for everyone, the $86 would probably need to
come from mandatory, prepaid, pooled funds rather than from private spending.
The second step is to exploit the link between country effort and the ratio of
GHE to GNI. A reasonable estimate of what ratio that indicates very high effort is
the upper centile for LICs and MICs when ranked from lowest to highest. For
2012, the upper centile ratio was 6.1%.3 The minimum GNIpc required to ensure
priority services for everyone given very high effort can then be estimated by
dividing the minimum GHEpc, that is $86, by the upper centile ratio, which gives
a GNIpc of $1410 (2012). It is important to note that the GNIpc and GHEpc
estimates used are not adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), which is in line
with the World Bank classification and most eligibility thresholds and allocation
policies employed today. Use of PPP-based estimates is likely to have generated
different results, and the advantages and disadvantages of such measures are
extensively discussed elsewhere.
The upshot of the two-step procedure is that countries below $1410 GNIpc will
be unable to ensure priority services for everyone, even if they exert very high
effort (by dedicating 6.1%ormore of GNI to health). From a capacity perspective,
it may thus be good reasons to consider all these countries eligible for DAH and
reasonable net recipients. Accordingly, $1410 may be what we can call the lower
capacity threshold. Its relations to other thresholds are illustrated in Figure 1.
Even if one believes that every country below the lower capacity threshold should
be eligible, it may not be appropriate to consider every country above that threshold
ineligible. One reason is that very high effort, by any reasonable standard, can
1 All dollar amounts in this article is in US dollars.
2 While the corresponding estimates for MICs are likely to be higher, partly due to higher price levels,
we will use that estimate throughout.
3 Based on World Bank data. Only countries with available GNIpc estimates for 2012 were included,
except Cuba (2011). These ratios are partly influenced by external funding and funders’ priorities.
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translate into a GHE/GNI ratio lower than 6.1% if the circumstances are difficult
enough. The set of barriers which countries face in their pursuit of social objectives
are not fully captured by GNIpc. Generally, it may also be easier to secure
a certain share of GNIpc for health, the higher GNIpc is, although evidence
suggests that both the ratio of general government expenditures to GNI and the
share of general government expenditures being devoted to health are largely
matters of political choice (reference to paper by Meheus and McIntyre and paper
by Elovainio and Evans in this series). In addition, we may not want to strictly
require very high effort for countries to be eligible. Accordingly, we may want to
Figure 1. Eligibility thresholds and gross national income per capita (GNIpc) of selected
countries.
Explanation: income classification thresholds are based on the World Bank classification for
fiscal year 2015. GNIpc figures are based on World Bank data for 2013 (Atlas method). All
figures are in US$. GNI = gross national income; LICs = low-income countries;
LMICs = lower middle-income countries; UMICs = upper middle-income countries;
IDA = The International Development Association; MCC = The Millennium Challenge
Corporation; UNDP = The United Nations Development Programme; UNICEF = The United
Nations Children’s Fund; GF = The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.
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identify a capacity-related threshold above which countries generally should be
considered ineligible.
We may identify such a threshold by asking what minimum level of GNIpc that
is required for a country to ensure priority services for everyone if it exerts
very low effort. The ratio that represents very low effort can be identified as the
lower centile for LICs and MICs when ranked from lowest to highest. For 2012,
the lower centile ratio was 1.5%. The minimumGNIpc required to ensure GHEpc
of $86 and priority services for everyone if a country exerts very low effort can
then be estimated to a GNIpc of $5733 (2012). From a capacity perspective, it
then appears to be good reasons for considering countries with a GNIpc above this
level generally ineligible for DAH – because all countries with GNIpc above this
level can be seen to have the capacity to ensure priority services for everyone
without external support. We may call this the upper capacity threshold.
Its relations to other thresholds are illustrated in Figure 1.
Also the upper capacity threshold may be challenged for being too restrictive,
for a range of reasons. One could be that the role of DAH goes beyond GHEpc of
$86. On the other hand, the upper capacity threshold may be challenged for being
too liberal and too damaging to incentives. The optimal threshold, from a capacity
perspective, may thus lie somewhere in between the lower and upper capacity
thresholds. Between these two thresholds, we may speak of a ‘capacity zone’. The
capacity thresholds and the capacity zone are illustrated in Figure 1. That figure
also exhibits the thresholds used in the World Bank income classification,
thresholds used by some major funders of DAH, and the GNIpc for the countries
listed in Table 1.
As indicated by the figure, the entire capacity zone falls within the GNIpc range
for MICs. Accordingly, from a capacity perspective, there are reasons to suggest
that some MICs should be eligible for DAH while other MICs should not.
Specifically, with respect to capacity, there seems to be a case for all LICs andmost
LMICs to be eligible and most UMICs to be ineligible.
Health needs
To address health needs is typically considered a central purpose of DAH, and
most discussions on the allocation of DAH centre on health needs (Bell and Fink,
2005; Gostin, 2014; IHME, 2016). There is a strong case for a country’s
legitimate claim to DAH to increase with unmet health needs, and there is a strong
imperative to attend to individual health needs wherever they are. This suggests
that health needs should be taken directly into account and that GNIpc is an
insufficient basis for identifying DAH recipients. Health needs may be considered
on a country-by-country basis, but we may also want to adjust the general GNIpc
threshold – based a concerns for capacity or otherwise – for such needs.
There are several reasons why one may want to adjust the general eligibility
threshold for health needs. Most fundamentally and as just described, there is
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a case for attending to unmet health needs wherever these are, and this have also
been put forward as a key reason to support MICs, including UMICs. In addition,
the legitimacy of the DAH system may partly depend on it being relevant to
a significant share of total health needs. Figure 2 shows the total number of under-
five deaths that is excluded from the scope of DAH across the range of possible
GNIpc thresholds. These thresholds are applied to countries and thus not directly
sensitive to internal income inequalities.
Figure 2 shows that asmany as 3.6million under-five deaths (56%) fall outside the
remit of DAH if the lower capacity threshold ($1410) is applied, while the number is
substantially reduced, to 582,000 (9%), if the upper threshold ($5733) is used.
The number of under-five deaths excluded from DAH dips at GNIpc of $1570,
$2710 and $6560; dips caused by India, Nigeria, andChina. A similar pattern is seen
for disease burden in terms of DALYs. If it is important not to exclude a major
amount and share of health needs from the scope of DAH, there is a reason to have a
threshold that is at least somewhat above the lower capacity threshold.
Another reason why one may want to adjust thresholds for health needs has to
do with the ratios between capacity, as proxied by GNIpc, and health needs across
countries. One may think that countries with low ratios should fall within the
reach of DAH even when they are capable – according to the reasoning described
above – to meet unexceptional health needs over time. Moreover, the ratios
between GNIpc and health needs may be relevant for fairness. It may seem unfair
if some ineligible countries have considerably higher ratios than some eligible
countries. Figure 3 shows the GNI/U5M and GNI/DALY ratio for LICs andMICs
with GNIpc below the upper capacity threshold.
Figure 3 shows that while the GNI/U5M and GNI/DALY ratios have a general
upward trend over GNIpc, there is considerable variation by country. The pattern
does not by itself suggest any obvious threshold. Instead, the figure underscores
the obvious point that, in addition to a general threshold, one may want eligibility
and allocation criteria to be more sensitive to country particularities. Accordingly,
one would like to make the GNIpc threshold part of the eligibility criteria in a way
that can both take such particularities into account and properly integrate the
concerns for capacity and need.
Further integration of capacity and need
A single eligibility threshold motivated by concerns for capacity and incentives
and generally adjusted for health needs may only be the first step towards balan-
cing capacity and needs. Further integration can be done by the parallel use of
needs-based exceptions and incentive-preserving instruments. The latter are
methods that help preserve countries’ incentives to address domestic health needs
themselves. Such exceptions and instruments are used by some DAH funders
already, but a review of major funders showed that many funders did not have
criteria explicitly linked to health needs or to inequalities (reference to paper by
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Figure 2. Total under-five deaths and disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) excluded from
the scope of DAH for different country-eligibility thresholds.
Explanation: based on World Bank data on gross national income (GNI), population, and
under-five mortality rate (U5MR) for 2013, World Bank data on crude birth rate for 2012,
and on IHME data on DALYs for 2010. Countries for which data were unavailable were
excluded.
Figure 3. Ratio of gross national income (GNI) to under-five mortality (U5M) and ratio of
GNI to disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) for countries below the upper capacity
threshold.
Explanation: GNI/U5M ratio based on World Bank data on GNI, population, and under-five
mortality rate for 2013 and on crude birth rate for 2012. GNI/DALY ratio based on World
Bank data on GNI for 2010 and IHME data on DALYs for 2010. Countries for which data
were unavailable were excluded.
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Ottersen, Kamath, Moon, Martinsen and Røttingen in this series), and there
seems to be great potential in a more careful integration of capacity and health
needs more generally. The challenge here, however, is to find the best compromise
between a single, over-simplistic threshold and a complex, opaque set of differ-
entiated criteria with multiple exceptions.
There are several types of health needs that may trigger exceptions. Most
obviously, exceptions may be warranted by poor aggregate health outcomes in the
country, linked to measures such as mortality rates or DALYs. Alternatively,
exceptions can be linked to a specific relation between health needs and capacity in
terms of GNIpc. For example, ratios of GNI relative to U5M and DALYs are
shown in Table 1 and Figure 3. Some funders already consider such ratios when
allocating development assistance (reference to paper by Ottersen, Kamath,
Moon, Martinsen and Røttingen in this series). For example, UNICEF uses an
allocation formula with GNIpc, U5MR and child population as the central
arguments. The Global Fund also uses a kind of need-based exceptions in deter-
mining eligibility as UMICs are only eligible if their burden from the disease in
question is ‘high’, ‘severe’ or ‘extreme’.
Given the nature of the challenge posed byMICs, needs-based exceptions should
probably go beyond country averages and account for the needs of subpopulations
(Kanbur and Sumner, 2012). For example, countries that have subpopulations
with severe health needs may be considered eligible even when GNIpc is above the
standard threshold and average population health is fairly adequate. As indicated
by Table 1, India and South Africa could be reasonable candidates for exceptions
based on subpopulation needs if the chosen standard threshold otherwise would
make them ineligible. Moreover, irrespectively of whether one compares the needs
of countries or subpopulations, it may be necessary to go beyond the current state to
also consider the risks for greater needs in the future. These risks may include
emerging epidemics and other infectious disease threats.
With needs-based exceptions, the issue of incentives reappears, although in a
different form. It will therefore be useful to combine such exceptions with
instruments for preserving countries’ incentives to properly address domestic
health needs themselves. As indicated above, this is essential because the countries’
own spending on health is likely to depend on the criteria used by funders to
allocate DAH and the allocated amounts. In particular, there is evidence sug-
gesting that DAH may displace some domestic financing for health (reference to
paper by Moon and Omole in this series).
Numerous considerations are relevant when designing incentive-preserving
instruments. Many of these have been widely discussed in the general literature
on aid conditionality (Gibson et al., 2005; Koeberle et al., 2005; Temple, 2010).
The design of an effective incentive-preserving-instrument scheme requires in
particular four careful choices. One key choice is whether incentive-preserving
instruments should be primarily linked to policies (inputs), outputs or outcomes.
Potentially relevant policy aspects include budget composition and government health
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expenditures, and service coverage rates are among the potentially relevant outputs.
For example, both the Global Fund and Gavi uses co-financing requirements, and, for
most kinds of support, Gavi also requires that coverage for the third dose of the
pentavalent vaccine diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, hepatitis B and Haemophilius
influenzae type B (Penta3) is equal to or above 70% (reference to paper by Ottersen,
Kamath, Moon, Martinsen and Røttingen in this series). A second key choice is
whether incentive-preserving instruments should be ex ante or ex post, where the latter
links funding to demonstrated achievements. Many funders currently experiment
with various results-based or performance-based aid schemes, but there is still no
agreement on whether and when these schemes work (Paul, 2015; Perakis and
Savedoff, 2015; Silverman et al., 2015). A third choice is the extent to which the
incentive-preserving instruments should depend on the state of affairs at a given
point in time or on improvements over time. While the former is more common, it
has been argued that linking conditionality to improvements can be crucial for
incentives (Öhler et al., 2012). A fourth choice, which is particularly important in
the context ofMICs, is the degree of targeting (Kanbur, 2016). Incentive-preserving
instruments can be specifically linked to addressing the needs of subpopulations or
reduction of inequalities. For example, the Global Fund requires that LMICs
and UMICs focus at least 50 or 100%, respectively, of the funding on key and
vulnerable populations, ‘highest impact interventions’, or both (reference to paper
by Ottersen, Kamath, Moon, Martinsen and Røttingen in this series).
Beyond these incentive-preserving instruments, funders may of course employ
broader requirements, which are not specifically linked to exceptions. Among
other things, funders could require a certain level of de facto effort for a country to
be eligible irrespectively of whether or not a high level of effort would be sufficient
to meet health needs. In any case, there are many well-known challenges related to
aid conditionality in general, including challenges of ensuring compliance and
of respecting country ownership (Gibson et al., 2005; Koeberle et al., 2005;
Temple, 2010), and some of these apply to incentive-preserving instruments. This
underscores the need for DAH funders to carefully examine their criteria and seek
ways to better balance the concerns for capacity and health needs.
Contribution norms and identification of funders
So far, we have addressed criteria for being eligible as a recipient of DAH, understood
as criteria for reasonably being a net recipient. These criteria do not automatically tell
which countries should be net funders. Reasonable criteria for identifying recipients
and funders share, however, a central concern for capacity or ability to pay.
National income and capacity
Capacity to pay, and specifically national income, is central to many, if not most,
contribution norms. One prominent example is the well-known 0.7 ODA/GNI
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target, which is based on GNI (Pearson et al., 1969). Another is the United
Nations scale of assessments, which is based on both GNI and GNIpc [United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 2012].
Also in the specific context of assistance for health, it is reasonable that the
criteria for identifying required net funders are at least partly based on capacity
and national income. Accordingly, wemaywant a GNIpc funder threshold similar
in kind to the eligibility threshold. The eligibility threshold is also a useful starting
point for specifying the funder threshold, but there are at least four reasons why
the latter may be set considerably higher than the former. Most obviously, one
may want to be fairly confident that countries do have the capacity to ensure
priority services for everyone domestically before calling on them to become net
funders. Second, it is preferable with a smooth transition from net recipient status
to net funder status (Salvado and Walz, 2013). Third, various transactions
costs (Acharya et al., 2006; Paul and Vandeninden, 2012) may suggest that the
differences between recipients and funders should be significant in most cases.
Fourth, countries may have a legitimate prerogative to privilege their own
population to some, yet limited extent. This may go beyond any practical
considerations as many, if not most, theories of global justice do leave space for
such a prerogative (Johri et al., 2012).
This set of reasons motivates a transition zone, that is, a range of GNIpc in
which countries are neither eligible for DAH nor required net funders. This zone
may extend from the chosen eligibility threshold to a significantly higher level of
GNIpc, as illustrated in Figure 4. As for the eligibility threshold, need-based
exceptions can be attached to the funder threshold.
These thresholds suggest that all or most LMICs should not be net funders,
while most UMICs should be.
Rationale for being both funder and recipient
One of the seemingly paradoxical features of today’s situation is that several
major recipients of DAH are also increasingly significant funders (GHSi, 2012;
IHME, 2016). For example, India and South Africa were among the top 10
recipients of DAH in 2011, but provided $1100 and $212 million in foreign
assistance in 2013 (GHA, 2014).
That some recipients of DAH also provide foreign aid can, of course, be
explained by various strategic political and economic interests. However, from a
system perspective, joint funder and recipient status may often be inefficient due to
transaction costs (Acharya et al., 2006; Paul and Vandeninden, 2012). At the
same time, there are reasons to suggest that such a joint status may be beneficial
even for the DAH system as a whole under certain circumstances. In particular,
this may the case when DAH goes beyond direct financial transfer to include some
form of knowledge transfer and when certain DAH recipients do have special
expertise relevant for other countries (Glennie, 2011; Verbeke and Renard, 2011;
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Glassman et al., 2013). Perhaps most clearly, countries that have recently made
progress may hold unique lessons for other countries. Thailand and Mexico, for
example, have recent experience with successful health reform and progress
towards UHC, and their insights can be valuable for many other countries
(Hughes and Leethongdee, 2007; Knaul et al., 2012). In addition, many countries
that are DAH recipients may have special expertise in the development and
production of low-cost delivery technologies. Accordingly, DAH in the form of
knowledge transfer and technical support can sometimes be usefully provided
by net recipients and usefully received by net funders.
Figure 4. Eligibility thresholds, gross national income per capita of selected countries, and
possible transition zone.
Explanation: income classification thresholds are based on the World Bank classification
for fiscal year 2015. GNIpc figures are based on World Bank data for 2013 (Atlas method).
All figures are in US$. GNI = gross national income; LICs = low-income countries;
LMICs = lower middle-income countries; UMICs = upper middle-income countries;
IDA = The International Development Association; MCC = The Millennium Challenge
Corporation; UNDP = The United Nations Development Programme; UNICEF = The United
Nations Children’s Fund; GF = The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.
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Conclusion
The role of MICs in the DAH system is a complex issue which also raises funda-
mental questions about the criteria for allocating DAH among countries and the
norms for which countries should contribute and how much. This gives reason for
major actors in the DAH system to critically examine their current criteria and
norms, and this paper has offered a framework for doing this. Funders may also
want to consider projections for economic growth and the geography of poverty, as
a majority of the world’s poor may again be located in LICs in the future. More
specifically, we offer four recommendations to these actors.
First, it is useful to focus on the central trade-off between the concerns for
capacity and incentives and the concern for meeting health needs everywhere. If a
single GNIpc eligibility threshold is desired for coherence and simplicity, the
capacity-based approach illustrated in this paper suggests a threshold between
$1410 and $5733. To the extent that this is reasonable, these thresholds suggest
that all LICs and most or all LMICs should be eligible, while most or all UMICs
should be ineligible. From the perspective of these illustrative thresholds, funders
such as Gavi and IDA could consider raising their threshold, while funders such as
the Global Fund, UNICEF and UNDP could consider lowering their threshold.
Second, while maintaining simplicity and transparency, it may be optimal
to combine a single general GNIpc eligibility threshold with a limited set of
needs-based exceptions and incentive-preserving instruments. The exceptions
and the instruments should plausibly pay particular attention to inequalities, the
needs of subpopulations, and other special health needs.
Third, relevant decision makers may implement a funder threshold at a GNIpc
level significantly higher than for the eligibility threshold. This will imply that
someMICs can reasonably be neither net recipients nor net funders. The capacity-
based approach illustrated in this paper suggests a funder threshold that requires
none or few LMICs to contribute significantly to DAH, but most UMICs to do so.
Fourth, decision makers should probably acknowledge that certain countries
can usefully be both recipients and funders, especially when DAH goes beyond
direct financial transfers.
In short, the role MICs should play in the DAH system is likely to be diverse.
Some may mainly be recipients, some may mainly be funders, some may be both
recipients and funders, and some neither. A simple, yet adequately nuanced
approach to MICs can help ensure that DAH is mobilised and allocated to
meet health needs in a complex global landscape.
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